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AFTERWORD:
DEMOCRATIC DISAGREEMENT AND
CIVIC EDUCATION



Amy Gutmann

THIS BOOK ADDRESSES A WIDE RANGE OF THE CHALLENGES that are faced in educating future generations of democratic citizens. Some pressing challenges stem from demographic processes that are creating an aging population, which may siphon away economic support for education of the young toward caring for the old. Other challenges arise from growing social and economic inequalities, making the work of schools in providing an education of both high quality and equal opportunity for all children increasingly difficult.

There are limits to what is educationally possible at any given time, but it is essential to recognize that democratic societies have significant choices to make among competing educational ends and means. Even if we never achieve a complete societal consensus, the search for ways of living together with our disagreements as fellow citizens has profound educational implications. Whether consciously or not, democracies rely on educational systems to shape the way in which diverse individuals learn from one another—or fail to do so—both within and across generations. That is what education—for better and for worse—is about.

This book is in large part concerned with how educational systems of various sorts can support the betterment of a democratic society. I will suggest here how we might orient our search for an answer by way of a democratic perspective—which takes disagreement seriously while benefiting from alternative approaches to problems.

Moral disagreement—disagreement about the desirable way to address issues that pertain to individuals' moral positions (gay marriage, stem cell research, and abortion are possible examples) is a persistent feature of an open

democratic society. Free and equal citizens can be expected to have different ideas about how to address these matters politically.

What is the capacity of a democratic society to cope in a morally reasonable way with political disagreements among citizens? The first part of my answer highlights three major ways that a democracy deals with disagreement: procedurally, constitutionally, and deliberatively. Each of these approaches is emphasized by a major conception of American democracy. Yet when push comes to shove, proceduralists, constitutionalists, and deliberative democrats alike recognize that fair procedures, constitutional rights, and moral deliberation are *all necessary, none sufficient* in engaging the wide range of disagreements that are unavoidable in a morally pluralistic society. The second part of my answer connects these three ways of dealing with disagreement with corresponding skills and virtues of democratic citizenship. The third part connects these skills and virtues with a rationale for the public schools' embrace of civic education.

Democratic Approaches to Disagreement

How can democracy best respond to moral disagreements?¹ Procedures are necessary for the fair and peaceful resolution of moral conflicts, and no one has yet proposed a decision-making procedure that is generally more justified than majority rule. If political equals disagree on moral matters, then the greater rather than the lesser number should normally rule. The alternative imposes the claims of the minority on the majority. The alternative may sometimes be preferable, but it calls for a justification of why some citizens' moral convictions count for more than those of others.

When majority rule is justified, the decision of a majority at any particular time is provisional. Subsequent majorities may enact revisions. Members of the losing minority can accept majoritarianism as a fair practice even when it yields incorrect results, as long as the minority's status as political equals is respected. The results of majority rule are legitimate as long as the procedure is fair. The results are not necessarily right. Numerical might does not make a decision morally right. When majority rule is not the fairest procedure, then another procedure needs to be justified with a rationale that is compatible with democratic values.

Fair procedures are essential to a healthy democratic society. But for procedures to be fair, citizens must appreciate the value of fairness as well as the value of majority rule (or its cousin, plurality rule). Majority rule is not always fair in and of itself. It typically must be accompanied by a concern for fairness so that majority decisions do not infringe upon the legitimate claims of individuals who find themselves in the minority. Fundamental constitutional values—including free speech, a free press, free association, the rule of law, universal adult suffrage, and religious freedom—serve therefore as constraints on majority rule in

American constitutional democracy. Some of these values are justified on procedurally democratic grounds; some are necessary to preserve the integrity of the democratic process over time. If a majority votes to disenfranchise women, for example, then it will be destroying an important precondition of a fair democratic procedure: universal adult suffrage. Something similar can be said if majorities take it upon themselves to restrict political speech, which is necessary to ensure that the considered opinions of citizens as free and equal beings are allowed public expression.

But it is not only as a condition of a fair democratic process that constitutional constraints on majority rule can be justified. Freedom of religion and conscience, and equal protection under the law, for example, are valuable independently of any contribution they make to the democratic nature of the political process. Religious freedom is widely recognized as a basic liberty of individuals, and deserves protection as an important value in its own right, not only as a precondition of a fair democratic process. Equal protection under the law is necessary to protect the basic opportunities of all individuals. As these examples suggest, American constitutional democracy recognizes certain substantive values not only as preconditions to a fair democratic process but as fundamental values independently of that process, and as such, they represent a second basis for resolving political disagreements.

The Bill of Rights is the primary (although not the only) collective reference point for these substantive values in American democracy. Not only the judiciary, but legislatures, bureaucracies, private associations, and individual citizens are responsible for respecting and protecting individual rights, to the extent that it is within their legitimate power. Constitutional rights need to be protected against both majorities and minorities who threaten the basic liberties or basic opportunities of individuals.

The basic liberties and opportunities of individuals are not always easily discernible. In the past, American constitutional democracy did not recognize or respect many of the basic liberties and opportunities that are routinely recognized and respected today, most conspicuously those of women and black Americans, but also of many other Americans. It would be hubris on the part of American citizens today to assume that American political institutions are now recognizing every basic liberty and opportunity, and not only those now considered "worthy" of protection.

It is also obvious (although too easily overlooked) that Americans disagree on how to interpret even constitutional protections—including freedom of speech, religious freedom, equal protection, and due process of law—that most Americans would affirm in the abstract. The "we" who disagree, often reasonably, include Supreme Court justices, legislators, public officials in charge of interpreting statutes, and private citizens to whom public officials are accountable.

We cannot realistically expect to resolve all of our politically relevant disagreements, nor would it be desirable for us to do so unless we resolved them on terms that were clearly justifiable. But who among us can demonstrate that controversies over abortion, affirmative action, capital punishment, pornography, school reform, health care reform, welfare reform, foreign interventions, and terms of trade with foreign countries are resolvable, either for now or once and for all, on clearly justifiable terms?

The third way that democracies can deal with disagreements is by citizens and public officials deliberating over the moral disagreements that proceduralism and constitutionalism, taken alone, leave unresolved. Deliberation is public discussion and decision making that aims to reach a justifiable resolution, where possible, and that fosters respect among individuals with regard to those reasonable disagreements that remain irresolvable. James Madison emphasized the importance of deliberation to American democracy, or what he and the other founders called republican government.² Voting is a far more valuable act if preceded by open-minded argument in which different sides not only represent their own views, but also listen to others and try to reach an economy of moral disagreement—avoiding unnecessary conflict by searching significant points of convergence—which minimizes rejection of those opposing positions that are worthy of respect.³

Defenders of proceduralism, constitutionalism, and deliberative democracy agree that the fundamental values of democratic institutions—such as equal political liberty—must be justified by moral arguments that are in principle acceptable to citizens who are bound by them. All seek to show that democratic institutions protect the equal right of citizens to participate in political processes and to enjoy basic liberties and opportunities. They also agree that individual citizens should be regarded as moral agents who deserve equal respect in any justifications of basic procedures and constitutional rights.

Deliberation, rather than being an alternative to procedures or constitutional rights, adds to both proceduralism and constitutionalism a way of explicitly respecting individuals as moral agents in a context of continual disagreement about important issues in everyday democratic discussion and decision making. Deliberation calls upon citizens and public officials to try to justify their political positions to one another, and in so doing to take into account the viewpoints of others who reasonably disagree. We can sum up the relationship between proceduralism, constitutionalism, and deliberation: Democratic procedures require that individuals are counted as one, and no more than one, among equals in political decision making. Constitutional rights require that the basic liberties and opportunities of all individuals are respected and protected even against a majority's decision to override those rights. Democratic deliberation requires that individuals discuss their political disagreements with one another, including disagreements over fair procedures and

constitutional rights, in an attempt to economize on moral disagreements and respect those that invariably remain.

If fair procedures, constitutional constraints, and moral deliberation could resolve political disagreements once and for all, then a sophisticated democratic form of government would not be necessary. But an end to political disagreement in any modern democracy would reflect the rise of repression, not the success of proceduralism, constitutionalism, and deliberation.

Skills and Virtues for Dealing with Disagreement

For its effectiveness in dealing with disagreements, American constitutional democracy has been designed to depend partly on institutions such as an electoral system that secures one person, one vote, a judiciary empowered to protect constitutional rights, and a legislature that deliberates before it votes. But people with certain skills and virtues—not those of saints, but those of citizens—are needed to realize the moral promise of the methods of proceduralism, constitutionalism, and deliberation. These methods do not work automatically. They depend for their success on citizens and accountable public officials acting in a spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding. One need only think of a citizenry voting to disenfranchise women and a judiciary deferring to the majority on this decision. Or one might imagine voting on any and all public matters by means of a personal computer terminal without any deliberation among citizens or their representatives. Considering these possibilities serves to indicate the considerable extent to which American democracy depends on the willingness and ability of individuals to support institutions that try to resolve disagreements consistently with fair procedures, constitutional rights, and public reasoning.

The procedural, constitutional, and deliberative practices that exist in American democracy depend on the ongoing support of citizens and their representatives. But this is only half of the story. Those practices that *could improve* the capacity of American democracy to resolve disagreements also depend on citizens and their representatives to collectively identify and create them. And those that present obstacles to improving American democracy similarly depend on citizens to reject them.

There is no reason to believe that either every existing practice and policy or none well serves the purposes of proceduralism, constitutionalism, and deliberation as modes of resolving disagreements on moral terms in American democracy. In light of the reasonable disagreements that exist, citizens and representatives should try to justify controversial political practices to one another.

Mutual justification is often an effective means to better outcomes, and it is also in itself a manifestation of mutual respect. Deliberation is the greatest political promise of American democracy. It is also one of the greatest challenges, especially as the United States continues to grow in diversity.

Proceduralism, constitutionalism, and deliberation depend on individuals in ways that therefore call for certain civic skills and virtues that would otherwise be less important. To the extent that these skills and virtues are closely connected to democracy's ways of dealing with disagreement, publicly funded schools should be called upon to cultivate them. Various skills and virtues are needed to support proceduralism, constitutionalism, and deliberation, and there are a number of ways in which schools can be called upon to foster them.

Each way of resolving disagreements calls upon citizens to exercise certain civic skills and virtues more than others. Proceduralism requires law-abidingness, respect for fair rules, and reasonable expectations of winning and losing. Fair political procedures cannot possibly guarantee that any person's opinion will carry the day, even when that person's opinion is correct. Proceduralism therefore also requires a capacity to delay gratification of one's desires, to tolerate dissent, and to persist in pursuing an outcome that one believes is just.

Proceduralism cannot assume that established procedures are fair, so it also calls for the ability of citizens to discern the difference between fair and unfair procedures. Citizens should try to change unfair procedures, in the way that some Americans opposed the discriminatory poll tax in 1964. Citizens also need to discern the difference between procedural outcomes that lie within the bounds of constitutional legitimacy and those that do not. From the perspective of procedural democracy, for example, a majority vote to decrease (or even end) public support of the arts is a qualitatively different outcome from a majority vote to fine or disenfranchise artists whose work offends the moral sensibilities of the majority. The former is within the legitimate power of the majority to legislate, while the latter is not.

People are likely to disagree about where the legitimate power of the majority ends and illegitimate power begins (where individual rights are violated). Others may disagree about fair democratic procedures in today's political context. Thoughtful citizens are bound to disagree over a wide range of procedural matters, since a wide range is subject to reasonable disagreement. Any procedure that is in place for resolving such disagreements over process is itself likely to be subject to reasonable disagreement. There is no morally certain escape from the possibility of such ongoing disagreement. Proceduralism looks to procedures for resolving disagreements. But it must look beyond procedures in any narrow sense of the term for dealing with moral disagreements about those procedures, such as which are fair and what outcomes are illegitimate, even if they followed from established procedures.

This limitation of proceduralism in dealing with disagreement points to the need for citizens to possess another important set of skills and virtues, without which proceduralism would be far less likely to distinguish fair from unfair or legitimate from illegitimate. These skills and virtues are closely tied to constitutionalism and deliberation. Constitutionalism calls for the capacity of citizens to

distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate outcomes of political procedures, as well as between fair and unfair procedures. Citizens must not only discern their own rights but also respect the rights of others. Restraint is often required to respect the rights of others, as when someone publicly speaks in terms that are morally offensive. Constitutionalism also calls on citizens to have the courage to stand up for those rights that are being violated, whether by a minority or majority.⁴

Several important constitutional rights—such as free speech and freedom of religion—require citizens to possess the virtue of tolerance. Other constitutional rights—such as equal protection and due process—require citizens to possess and practice the virtue of nondiscrimination in their everyday associations with one another. Americans must not discriminate against one another on the basis of color, gender, religion, and sexual orientation in any business, commercial endeavor, or other public association. And they must be able to discern what kind of behavior nondiscrimination entails: more than just a prohibition on charging more or paying people less but also a prohibition on decreasing (or increasing) their opportunities because of irrelevant characteristics such as skin color.

Because deliberation entails trying to reason together about public policy in an effort to reach mutually acceptable decisions, it explicitly calls upon citizens who disagree on many moral and political issues not only to tolerate one another but also to develop mutual respect. Mutual respect entails the capacity to discern and respectfully discuss disagreements over what constitute fair procedures and defensible constitutional rights. Both the procedural and constitutional aspects of democracy have more potential for self-improvement to the extent that citizens and their accountable representatives are willing to deliberate about fairness and legitimacy of outcomes.

Although the civic skills associated with democracy also include the ability to negotiate and bargain, the deliberative capacity of citizens is needed to distinguish between those times when bargaining and negotiation are more and less appropriate. Bargaining and negotiation, we might think, are important skills to enlist in situations where agreement on moral terms is unnecessary (because nothing morally important is at stake) or undesirable (because one or another side in the controversy is unwilling to assume a moral perspective and therefore likely to take advantage of anyone who did). It is the willingness and ability to deliberate that enables citizens to discern when these situations arise. Without the capacity to deliberate, there would be no escaping from power politics—which give power priority over both justice and deliberation—which all moral conceptions of democracy are intent on avoiding.

Why do American citizens need to deliberate about constitutional rights when a written constitution enumerates those rights, and a judiciary is authorized to interpret and enforce them? Any extended discussion of the practical

implications of free speech, religious freedom, and nondiscrimination would demonstrate that interpretations of constitutional rights are open to reasonable disagreement.

Does the constitutional protection of free speech also protect all forms of pornography? Does the constitutional protection of religious freedom permit parents to exempt their children from any parts of a public school curriculum that offend their religious beliefs? Does the constitutional prohibition on racial discrimination also extend to a prohibition on taking race into account as one factor among many in employment or college admissions?

For these and many other disagreements to be resolved on moral terms, rather than by self-interested or group-interested bargaining, citizens and their accountable representatives must be willing to engage in a politics of reasoning and persuasion rather than a politics of manipulation and coercion. Individuals also must be willing to engage in public discourse with one another that is empirically informed and morally reasonable. They must recognize and treat other citizens as equals in democratic discourse and decision making on the condition that they themselves are extended the same recognition and treatment. This capacity is sometimes called civility. But it should not be confused with etiquette or politeness. Civility is a moral (not an aesthetic) attitude, which depends on reciprocity. You treat me as an equal, provided I treat you as such.

We earn each other's respect as equal citizens in some very basic ways. We show ourselves capable of abiding by the results of fair procedures, honoring the rights of others, and supporting the passage of laws and public policies that we can justify to one another. We develop and defend our political positions by addressing the reasonable concerns of others, and we have similar expectations of others. Without the civic skills and virtues that allow individuals to earn one another's respect as equal citizens, a democracy cannot resolve the disagreements that arise among its citizens on moral grounds or expect its citizens to live well with those disagreements that invariably remain.

Fostering Civic Skills and Virtues in Schools

What role should schools play in cultivating the civic skills and virtues of a democratic society? A citizenry without the tools that support proceduralism, constitutionalism, and deliberation does not bode well for a democratic society. There is a great deal of concern today that families, schools, and other social institutions are not cultivating the skills and virtues of democratic deliberation. There is also a great deal of cynicism about whether any single person or institution has the will or the means to make a moral difference. In contemporary political discourse, communicating by sound bite, competing by character assassination, and resolving conflicts through self-seeking bargaining, logrolling, and pork barreling too often substitute for moral deliberation on the merits of issues.

Recommitting primary and secondary education in the United States to the value of democratic citizenship would be one important way of reducing this democratic deficit. Although the need for American political life to rely less on sound bites and more on substantive interchange is ever more widely appreciated, the need to improve education in a more democratic direction is still sorely neglected, to the detriment of both education and democracy. Unless American citizens, educators, and public officials alike increase their appreciation of educating all children, not merely for literacy, numeracy, and economic productivity but for the more inclusive goal of democratic citizenship, they forsake the promise of American democracy. Emphasizing the civic responsibilities of the American educational system is certainly not the only way to improve either the educational system or American democracy, neither is it sufficient by itself. Nonetheless, the public justification offered for a publicly funded system of primary and secondary education has long been that of providing educational opportunity for all and educating all to the skills and virtues of democratic citizenship. There is no single realm more distinctively connected to these two purposes. Moreover, there is a greater social need than ever for schools to focus on civic purposes in light of the decline in other civic associations and the increasing demands placed on parents outside the family. Parents undoubtedly can have more influence over children than schools, but they also have far broader responsibilities for children than that of education for opportunity and citizenship.

Schools are the major realm in which every nonadult member of society should, if possible, be taught the skills and virtues that are necessary for effective citizenship in an increasingly complex and interdependent society. Well-run schools model some of the most basic skills and virtues of a democratic society: they institutionalize fair procedures, honor individual rights, and expect all individuals to demonstrate mutual respect by doing their share to contribute to an overriding mission.

There is also evidence, outlined in several excellent studies, that the curriculum of schools can make a difference in teaching some of the more demanding virtues of democratic citizenship, such as toleration and mutual respect.⁵ Some of these studies show that diverse groups of students, working together on a project over an extended period of time, effectively increase toleration, a result that demonstrates some staying power over time.

A skeptic might still challenge the idea that teaching toleration can be publicly defended in light of the differing perspectives about right and wrong, good and bad, decent and indecent, worthy and unworthy, that are present in a pluralistic, multicultural democracy. But the skeptical challenge either proves too much or too little. It proves too much if it doubts that publicly subsidized schools can defend the teaching of *any* values. Schools cannot help but teach values, even if they do so unconsciously, in the way that they decide who teaches and who is taught, what is included and excluded from the curriculum, and how students

are taught inside and outside of the classroom. The claim that teaching toleration is controversial proves too little if it simply calls attention to the lack of universal agreement on almost any basic value. The fact that toleration and other fundamental values of American democracy are controversial offers no reason not to defend their teaching. Quite the contrary, were the fundamental values of democracy uncontroversial, there would be far less reason for schools to concern themselves with teaching civic values.

Publicly subsidized schools, like democratic governments more generally, are public trusts. Democratic societies have no better alternative than to educate future citizens to those civic values, such as toleration, that are procedurally, constitutionally, and deliberatively defensible. Schools in the United States can teach toleration—probably not under all circumstances and against all odds, but in enough situations that the call for civic education in schools is not an idle one. Schools can also teach deliberation. Diane Ravitch has cited an excellent example of the way in which a public school in Brooklyn, New York, taught students to deliberate in a history class. The students in the class were discussing whether it was moral for the United States to drop the atomic bomb on Japan:

The lesson was taught in a Socratic manner. [Mr.] Bruckner [the teacher] did not lecture. He asked questions and kept up a rapid-fire dialogue among the students. “Why?” “How do you know?” “What does this mean?” . . . By the time the class was finished, the students had covered a great deal of material about American foreign and domestic politics during World War II; they had argued heatedly; most of them had tried out different points of view, seeing the problem from different angles.⁶

This kind of teaching makes students exercise and thereby develop their capacities to reason collectively about politics—an ability that is no less essential to democratic citizenship because it is difficult to measure by survey research. Some surveys show that different kinds of teaching do make a difference in terms of how effective civic education is in the classroom.⁷

Education is not only a public good. The parental prerogative must also be given its due in a constitutional and deliberative democracy. Parents are a child’s primary educators, except in desperately unfortunate situations. But just as democratic governments in the United States are constitutionally bound to recognize the rights of parents, parents have a constitutional responsibility as American citizens to recognize that their children are future citizens of a democratic society, with their own rights and responsibilities.

Should schools go beyond teaching the most basic virtue of toleration and also teach mutual respect? Toleration—an attitude of live and let live that entails no positive regard among citizens—is an essential value of American constitutional democracy, and one of its great historical accomplishments. Toleration

makes possible peace—a precondition for all other democratic accomplishments. But toleration is not enough to create a democratic society with liberty and justice for all, where “all” includes people of differing religions, ethnicities, colors, and cultures. Absent mutual respect, people discriminate against one another on the basis of a host of cultural differences; we fail to take one another’s political perspectives seriously; and we therefore treat one another in ways that are not conducive to constructive collective action. If educators do not try to teach future citizens the importance of mutual respect among people whose ideas and perspectives on life differ from their own, then who will?

Educators can teach mutual respect by encouraging their students to engage in the give and take of argument, as did Mr. Bruckner in the Brooklyn public school example given above. In the process of arguing vigorously but respectfully about a political issue, students learn to reflect, individually and collectively, on both the reasonable differences and commonalities that constitute a pluralistic democracy.

Toleration and recognition of cultural differences are both desirable parts of multicultural education. As part of their democratic and civic education, students should learn not only how to accept differences among groups that constitute society, but also to recognize the role that cultural differences have played in shaping society and the world in which children live. To teach and to learn in this way requires open-mindedness and engagement on the part of both teachers and students with perspectives different from one’s own. It does not entail either moral relativism or skepticism.

Mutual respect can be cultivated by learning from diverse people and perspectives, not by giving up one’s own beliefs, but by acknowledging that one’s beliefs are informed by those of others. Learning to learn from others does not promise resolution of all the differences that divide a pluralistic democracy. Such comprehensive unity is surely impossible in a free society, and in all likelihood undesirable. Learning to learn from others is part of the virtue of mutual respect among citizens, and mutual respect expresses the democratic ideal of equal citizenship.

Mutual respect is also an instrumental value: it enables a democracy to resolve provisionally as many differences as possible in a mutually acceptable way. Bringing more mutual respect into education addresses the challenge of moral pluralism on democratic terms, rather than trying to dissolve differences by either philosophical or political fiat.

A study of perspectives on citizenship education suggests that despite varying views among social studies teachers of what citizenship education ideally should be, self-identified conservatives, moderates, and liberals all share a core set of convictions about citizenship education that include the following: encouraging tolerance and open-mindedness, addressing controversial issues, and developing an understanding of different cultures.⁸ These are also among the civic virtues recommended by procedural, constitutional, and deliberative ways of

resolving disagreements in democracy. I have suggested some ways that schools can teach these virtues and cited some studies that provide an “existence proof” that some ways of teaching make a positive difference in teaching some of these virtues. Were there a will among schools to teach the virtues and skills of democratic citizenship, the evidence suggests that there would be more than one way to do so.

Democratically justifiable schools are ones that work toward a democratic ideal of civic equality: individuals should be treated and treat one another as equal citizens, regardless of their gender, race, ethnicity, race, or religion. More or less civic equality distinguishes more from less democratic societies. Democratic education—publicly supported education that is defensible according to a democratic ideal—should educate children so that they are capable of assuming the rights and correlative responsibilities of equal citizenship, which include respecting other people’s equal rights. In short, democratic education should both express and develop the capacity of all children to become equal citizens.

There is no simple substitute for judging schools—however they are chosen—on their educational merits, where those merits include civic education. Civic education—the aims of which include the ability to argue and appreciate, understand and criticize, persuade and collectively decide in a way that is mutually respectable even if not universally acceptable—is a central merit of schools in a constitutional democracy. The fairness of our political processes, the protection of our constitutional rights, and the quality of our collective deliberations are all the more important in this context. Schools that cultivate the capacity of citizens to deliberate on moral terms about their ongoing disagreements are our best hope for the future of American democracy.⁹

Notes

1. The author relies in this essay on arguments and evidence presented in Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).
2. See especially “Jared Sparks: Journal,” in *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, edited by Max Farrand, rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), vol. 3, 479.
3. A discussion and defense of the democratic virtue of economizing on moral disagreement can be found in Gutmann and Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, esp. 82–94.
4. This description and an excellent discussion of virtues attached to constitutional democracy can be found in William Galston, *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State* (Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), esp. 224–27.
5. For evidence on the effectiveness of teaching tolerance, see: Patricia G. Avery et al., “Exploring Political Tolerance with Adolescents,” *Theory and Research in Social*

- Education 20, no. 4 (fall 1992): 386–420. The pedagogical techniques that are detailed in this study include important aspects of teaching mutual respect as well as toleration.
6. Diane Ravitch, *The Schools We Deserve: Reflections on the Educational Crises of Our Times* (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 288.
 7. Morris Janowitz discusses some surveys that “indicate that students in classrooms exposed to moderate-to-frequent amounts of classroom discussion about politics did better than those without such discussion.” Students exposed to political discussion in the classroom demonstrated both better reasoning capacities and more factual knowledge. See Janowitz, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 154. For another discussion of the desirability and possibility of teaching deliberation in schools, see Amy Gutmann, *Democratic Education* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987).
 8. Christopher Anderson et al., “Perspectives on Citizenship Education,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Francisco, April 22, 1995.
 9. Special thanks to the Spencer Foundation for the Senior Scholar Grant that supported work on this article.